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LAWYERS, LOYALTY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
DEBORAH J. CANTRELLt
ABSTRACT
Fundamentally, cause lawyers engage in their work to make social
change. Scholars of cause lawyering have generated a robust and rich
literature considering important issues, such as what kinds of advocacy
strategies best generate social change and what features of the relation-
ship between cause client and cause lawyer are critical to an engaged
and mutual relationship. But, the literature has neglected a key aspect of
the cause lawyer and client relationship: whether the particular kind of
loyalty that exists as between them hinders or helps in achieving social
change. This Article fills that void. It first illuminates the particular fea-
tures of the kind of loyalty that is expected between cause lawyers and
their clients, including features such as a mutually engaged relationship
and a strict conception offriends and enemies. Labeling that loyalty as
"hyper-loyalty," this Article scrutinizes whether the extreme fidelity re-
quired by hyper-loyalty helps produce actual social change. Drawing on
multiple fields, including negotiation and cognitive psychology, this Arti-
cle demonstrates that hyper-loyalty impedes social change by limiting
the range of relationships that can be explored as sites for problem solv-
ing. The Article offers a way forward, suggesting that hyper-loyalty be
replaced by relational loyalty. The three key features of relational loyalty
are: constructing the architecture of social change so that it is a con-
nected web of relationships instead of dyadic and oppositional; ap-
proaching that web of relationships with curiosity instead of advocacy;
and responding with compassion to all contained in the web of relation-
ships. This Article argues that relational loyalty inculcates a helpful dy-
namism in relationships, which both preserves mutual engagement be-
tween cause lawyer and cause client, while also creating unexpected
opportunities to craft innovative strategies or pathways to social change.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following two attorneys: an anti-poverty cause lawyer'
who is bilingual and works in a community in which most residents are
t Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Special thanks to the interdisci-
plinary group of scholars hosted by Fordham Law School who gave me detailed feedback, especially
Russ Pearce, Amy Uelmen, lan Weinstein, and Judy Povilus. Thanks also to Clare Huntington,
Nestor Davidson, Emma Leheny, Howard Lesnick, Erik Pitchal, Jacob Rukeyser, and workshop
colleagues at Colorado Law and University of Georgia Law School.
1. The term "cause lawyer' was coined by Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, and replaced
the phrase "public interest lawyer." See AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHENIGOLD, Cause Lawyering
and the Reproduction of Professional Authority, An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
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recent immigrants and a government official who spent a couple of years
working as a staff attorney at a legal aid office before moving into pri-
vate practice, and ultimately being appointed to her current high-level
position in the state's social services agency. Both the advocate and the
government official went to the same elite law school. Both have shared
professional connections. The advocate has been hearing from communi-
ty members that the local government benefits office is refusing to pro-
vide supplemental nutritional assistance applications in any language
other than English. When the advocate hears that the government official
is holding a series of town hall meetings in the area, the advocate makes
plans to attend to raise the issue of language accessibility. The advocate
remarks to her colleagues how frustrating it is to see a very smart person
like the government official working "for the enemy." 2 The advocate
notes that even though she thinks the official's own legal aid background
could be very helpful in problem-solving related to a particular issue, the
advocate just cannot trust anyone who now works for the government.
The advocate concludes that she had heard that the official was a nice
person, which she had no reason to disbelieve, but she felt uninspired to
try and forge any relationship with the official. The advocate planned to
attend the meeting not with any belief that there would be a useful ex-
change between the participants, but because the advocate felt it was
necessary to show the government official that the local community was
strong and committed to opposing the agency's inappropriate behavior.
The vignette highlights a common feature of social change advoca-
cy-that participants, including cause lawyers, identify strongly with
their side of the issue and distrust-with a similar intensity-participants
on the other side. In fact, this Article argues that such hyper-loyalty is
considered a core condition and baseline requirement of the relationship
between cause lawyer and cause client. In shorthand, it is part of the
DNA of how a cause lawyer works. 3 That hyper-loyalty is laudable in
many ways. It creates an expectation that the relationship between cause
lawyer and cause client will carry over time and over multiple advocacy
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3-5 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1998). The concept of cause lawyering differentiates between a lawyer who
essentially is agnostic about who are her clients or what kind of outcome her clients may be seeking,
and lawyers who commit to a particular kind of substantive work or a particular category of clients
because the lawyer is committed to some broader set of social or political principles. See AUSTIN
SARAT & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, What Cause Lawyers Do for, and to, Social Movements: An
Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 3-4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A.
Scheingold eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2006); see also Deborah J. Cantrell, Sensational Reports: The
Ethical Duty of Cause Lawyers to Be Competent in Public Advocacy, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 568,
569-71 (2007) (providing a definition of "cause lawyer").
2. This vignette is based on many similar conversations that I heard during my own time as a
public interest lawyer.
3. Nestor Davidson helpfully suggested the DNA metaphor.
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efforts, and is not a one-off relationship of short duration.4 The cause
lawyer and client are in the struggle together.5 It creates an expectation
that the cause lawyer and the cause client fundamentally agree on at least
some components of a "just" society. The cause lawyer and client believe
in the struggle. 6 In its best form, it also forges a relationship that is mutu-
al, reciprocal, and in which both cause lawyer and cause client under-
stand and trust each other to bring relevant expertise to the advocacy
work.' The cause lawyer and client are both soldiers in the struggle.8
Cause lawyers and cause lawyering scholars have focused inten-
sively on the above features of the lawyer-client relationship, and the
role of hyper-loyalty in fostering those features. However, they have
done so while neglecting the central point of the cause lawyer-cause cli-
ent relationship-to make actual social change. The unexamined as-
sumption in the existing scholarship is that hyper-loyalty increases the
possibilities for effective social change. This Article fills the unpropi-
tious void in the scholarship by critically examining hyper-loyalty. It
scrutinizes the assumed truth that because hyper-loyalty makes the cause
lawyer and cause client feel better and stronger about their relationship,
the relationship, in turn, helps the cause lawyer and cause client actually
achieve social change.
This Article comes to a conclusion that may surprise many-that
hyper-loyalty creates more potential to impede social change work than
to assist such work. In particular, this Article identifies a particularly
problematic consequence of hyper-loyalty, noted in the vignette above,
which is that it encourages cause lawyers and cause clients to identify
others either as friends or enemies, and to hold steadfast to that dichoto-
my. Drawing on a range of literature, including work on cognitive heu-
ristics and biases, negotiation theory, and scholarship about intentional
relationships in social movements, this Article demonstrates several
ways in which hyper-loyalty impedes the flexibility needed to effect so-
cial change.
To avoid the negative consequences of hyper-loyalty, this Article
re-envisions what it means for cause lawyers and cause clients to be loyal
to each other. This Article recognizes the important starting contribution
the existing literature made by insisting that the cause lawyer and the
cause client must understand each other both as bringing expertise to the
relationship, and that the relationship must be mutually engaged and re-
4. See generally Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Political Law-
yering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297, 298-302 (1996) (describing several multi-pronged cam-
paigns for which Bellow was the cause lawyer).
5. See id. at 302-03 (describing Bellow's own experiences as a cause lawyer).
6. See id. at 300.
7. See id. at 302-04 (describing the respectful relationship necessary for effective cause
lawyering).
8. See id. at 300-04.
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spectful. However, this Article then calls on cause lawyers and clients to
create a more relational form of loyalty to each other, not by bringing
distance to their own relationship but instead by situating their relation-
ship within a larger web of relationships of participants engaged on an
issue. The notion of a web of relationships, rather than hyper-loyalty's
dyadic contest with friends on one side and enemies on the other, creates
space for both cause lawyers and cause clients to expand the realm of
participants with whom a connection may be explored. Whereas hyper-
loyalty views exploring relationships across the line as disloyalty, rela-
tional loyalty understands exploration of the web of relationships as a
method of fostering new, and at times unexpected, but useful, collabora-
tors for social change.
This Article adds two additional key components to relational loyal-
ty. First, drawing particularly on negotiation literature, relational loyalty
calls on participants to approach others in the web of relationships with
curiosity, not advocacy. The softening of a stance from advocate to in-
quirer is designed to create a more expansive dialogue, which, like the
web itself, should bring forward new and possibly unexpected, but use-
ful, information. Next, relational loyalty calls on participants to approach
others in the web of relationships with compassion. This Article sharply
distinguishes between compassion and acquiescence or capitulation.
Compassion is not silence or the whitewashing of injustice. But the call-
ing out of injustice need not happen only in righteous anger. It can hap-
pen more productively from a compassionate stance that looks for oppor-
tunity in the particular situation with particular people.
In Part I, this Article traces the development of hyper-loyalty as a
core component of the relationship between cause lawyer and client.
Then, it describes the legitimate concerns about how to build a respectful
and mutual relationship between cause lawyers, who regularly come
from elite backgrounds, and cause clients, who regularly come from un-
derserved or underrepresented communities. It also describes the positive
features of hyper-loyalty as a way of communicating and cementing trust
between disparate participants, as a way of expressing mutual respect
and acknowledging mutual expertise. Part II turns to the harmful aspect
of hyper-loyalty detailing the ways in which it impedes cause lawyers
and clients from achieving actual social change. Part III builds out the
components of relational loyalty, including refraining participants as
being situated within a web of relationships and approaching all with
curiosity and compassion. Part IV acknowledges and addresses some
potential concerns about moving from hyper-loyalty to a relational loyal-
ty.
I. THE ROLE OF LOYALTY IN CAUSE LAWYERING
Scholars of cause lawyering, and cause lawyers themselves, take as
an important truth that loyalty is a key feature of the relationship between
944 [Vol. 89:4
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cause lawyers and their clients. In contrast to much for-profit lawyering,
cause lawyering brings with it robust notions of solidarity between client
and lawyer.9 The proposition is that there is more solidarity between the
cause lawyer and client because both of them understand their work to-
gether to be situated within a larger interest in social change. As Gary
Bellow articulated the relationship, it is a "politicized orientation" with
"the legal work . .. done in service to both individuals and larger, more
collectively oriented goals."o Independent of their legal relationship, the
lawyer and client are loyal to each other because of their shared com-
mitment to their cause, whatever it may be. Their "cause loyalty" is
stronger than the typical professional loyalty between lawyer and client.
It is hyper-loyalty.
That hyper-loyalty is the expected norm in cause work is not sur-
prising. Most cause lawyers, and many cause clients, are committed to
"doing the work" in a long-term way." They form long-term relation-
ships with each other, and even though there may be individual changes
over time between particular lawyers or clients, there is a strong level of
general continuity between the cause lawyering shop and the lay advoca-
cy community. For a historical example, think of the cause lawyers at
California Rural Legal Aid who worked closely with Cesar Chavez and
the United Farm Workers Union on several advocacy efforts.' 2
9. See Bellow, supra note 4, at 302 (noting the importance of "mutuality" in the relationship
between client and cause lawyer); see also Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking
Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369,
375 (1982) (calling for "counter-hegemonic" legal practice in which goal is to forge "authentic"
political collaborative between client and cause lawyer); Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge ofDemo-
cratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383, 1384-85 (2009). See generally GERALD P. LOPEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Lucie
E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L.
REV. 699 (1988) (highlighting the story of a Black South African village and the methods of the
"outsiders" who worked with them to empower resistance as a model for change-oriented lawyer-
ing); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project,
and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995) (articulating a social
change plan to aid immigrant workers as a whole, instead of individual clients only); William P.
Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organ-
izations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455 (1995) (Jefining the critical criteria for empowering organiza-
tional advocacy); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (New York Univ. Press 2001)
(explaining the environmental justice movement); Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities:
Lawyering Across Language Diference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007) (suggesting the benefit to
community lawyering of a more collaborative relationship among lawyers, clients, and third-parties
such as interpreters); Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 1879 (2007) (discussing progressive public interest lawyers in the context of one campaign
involving immigrant labor).
10. Bellow, supra note 4, at 300.
I1. However, the privatization of pro bono legal work has somewhat altered that dynamic as
private law firms have built out books of business focused on providing free legal services often
related to cause lawyering. Because of very practical business concerns about conflicts of interest
with paying clients, private firms often pick one or two causes on which to focus, pairing in a long-
term way with one of two non-profit cause lawyering shops. See generally Scott L. Cummings, The
Politics ofPro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004).
12. See Bellow, supra note 4, at 298.
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Additionally, a constitutive part of social change, or cause, work is
that cause advocates are pushing against the status quo. In order to mobi-
lize a collective for action, there must be some sense that there is one
group pushing for change and one group content with the status quo-in
other words, some sense of "us" and "them."' 3 The existing cause law-
yering literature has focused heavily on what cause lawyers must do to
ensure that there is a strong sense of "us" between cause lawyers and
cause clients. The Article turns now to those particular features of hyper-
loyalty.
A. The Ideal of Hyper-Loyalty
The ideal features of hyper-loyalty are straightforward. Lawyers and
clients are equal and "co-eminent practitioners" in their work towards
social change.14 Clients are "not just sources of information on the prob-
lems they face, but [also are] active partners in working collectively to
solve those problems."15 Lawyers and clients both are careful to view
each other as a "whole person,"i not as "cardboard" 7 cut-outs of what a
lawyer or client is expected to be under mainstream views of the legal
profession. Hyper-loyalty, however, is not an "oversentimentalized"
sense of relationship.' 8 As Gary Bellow has described it: "I surely influ-
enced and argued with those I served, often loudly and long. But I, in
turn, was influenced and argued with as well, and felt justified in assert-
ing my views only because I also felt open to being overruled or outvot-
ed."l 9
While hyper-loyalty can be between an individual lawyer and an in-
dividual client, it can also be between multiple lawyers and multiple cli-
ents or communities. 20 Nonetheless, it is dyadic in that it understands the
core commitment to be between the lawyer(s) and the cli-
ent(s)/community. While both lawyers and clients may look for oppor-
tunistic alliances with others, those alliances should neither weaken, nor
necessarily expand, the hyper-loyalty that exists in the dyad. 2 1 By defini-
13. See, e.g., ALBERTO MELUCCI, The Process of Collective Identity, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND CULTURE: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PROTEST, CONTENTION 47-49 (H. Johnston & B. Klandermans
eds., 1995) (noting that a collective must distinguish between itself and others in order to act and
mobilize).
14. LOPEZ, supra note 9, at 29.
15. Piomelli, supra note 9, at 1385.
16. For an early, yet still very prescient, description of lawyers not seeing the client as a
"whole person," see Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS. 1, 21 (1975).
17. The phrase "cardboard clients" comes from Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard
Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 103-04 (2010).
18. Bellow, supra note 4, at 303.
19. Id. at 302-03.
20. In fact, some scholars insist that the better version of cause loyalty is between lawyers and
communities, and that cause lawyers should be wary of individualized lawyer-client relationships.
See, e.g., Ashar, supra note 9, at 1880, 1921-24.
21. See, e.g., Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for
Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395, 404-05 (2004) (providing an example of an
946 [Vol. 89:4
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tion and by action, hyper-loyalty presumes there are others or groups of
others to whom loyalty is not owed, and to whom displays of affinity are
not permitted.
Interestingly, hyper-loyalty can come about directly as discussed
above, but also indirectly as discussed below.
B. Two Indirect Routes to Hyper-Loyalty
The ideal of hyper-loyalty discussed above is a direct and intention-
al commitment to a relationship in which the cause lawyer and cause
client stand together against others. Hyper-loyalty is in place because
both lawyer and client desire their relationship to have that feature. How-
ever, a cause relationship can also indirectly become infused with hyper-
loyalty. As described more fully below, that indirect infusion results
from a cause lawyer compensating for other concerns about how she is in
relationship with her client. Nonetheless, whether infused directly or
indirectly, the consequence of hyper-loyalty is the same-cause lawyers
and cause clients hold fierce notions of "us" and "them."
The first indirect route to hyper-loyalty comes from cause scholars'
and lawyers' long-expressed worry that, historically and currently, the
legal profession is predominantly populated by members of the elite.22
As a result, lawyers from elite backgrounds have dominated cause law-
yering. As one scholar articulated the concern: "There are . . . significant
dangers when middle class lawyers get intimately involved in the task of
organizing the poor. More articulate, better educated, aggressive by na-
ture and training, some lawyers tend to dominate newly formed groups,
even when they try not to . . . .,,23 Thus, there has been a sustained nerv-
ousness about whether cause lawyers, even with their good intentions,
are capable of establishing and maintaining a mutual and reciprocal rela-
tionship with their clients.
The seminal critique of cause lawyers captured by elite culture is
Gerald Lopez's Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Pro-
gressive Law Practice.24 Lopez coined the phrase "regnant lawyer" to
environmental justice lawyer and low-income community thinking through whether to form an
alliance with yuppie neighborhoods that also might be affected).
22. For an example of historical, socioeconomic information, see generally JOHN P. HEINZ &
EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (Russell Sage
Foundation, 1982). For socioeconomic information about newer members of the legal profession,
see generally RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD 20 (NALP Foundation & American Bar
Foundation 2004) (noting that "newly admitted lawyers come generally from relatively privileged
socioeconomic backgrounds."); Richard Sander & Jane Yakowitz, The Secret of My Success: How
Status, Prestige and School Performance Shape Legal Careers 11, Brooklyn Law School, Legal
Studies Paper No. 207; 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper; UCLA School of
Law Research Paper No. 10-26 (2010) (analyzing data from the After the JD study), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1640058.
23. Ruth M. Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Diference in Poverty Law Scholarship, 48
U. MIAMI L. REv. 999, 1024 (1994).
24. LOPEZ, supra note 9.
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describe those lawyers, cause or otherwise, who understand themselves
as experts in charge of lay clients and who presume that lay clients bring
no useful skills to the advocacy question at hand.25 For Lopez,
[Regnant lawyering] imposes unjustifiably limited relations between
those working against subordination and those strategies available to
wage the fight. It does not permit anyone in the fight, whether lay or
professional, to experience others as part of a working team. And it
almost laughs off anyone who wants to regard others as co-eminent
practitioners. 26
The regnant cause lawyer is disloyal to the client by failing to "ex-
press the highest regard for a client's understanding of his own situa-
1127tion .... Furthermore, the regnant cause lawyer is disloyal to a client
or community of clients by failing to understand that everyone has an
inherent ability to lawyer in the sense of having "built-in, problem-
solving, domination-fighting capacit[ies]."2 8
For Lopez, the antidote to regnant lawyering is rebellious lawyering
against subordination-what I have called the ideal of hyper-loyalty. As
Lopes articulates it:
[L]awyers must know how to work with, not just on behalf of, subor-
dinated people. They must know how to collaborate with other pro-
fessional and lay allies rather than ignore the help that these other
problem-solvers may provide in any situation. . . . And, at least as
importantly, they must open themselves to being educated by the
subordinated and their allies about the traditions and experiences of
subordinated life. 29
From a commitment to rebellious lawyering, Lopez crafts a kind of
hyper-loyalty between lawyer and client that requires the lawyer to con-
strain herself to ensure that the client is not subordinated within the law-
yer-client relationship. Lopez's goal is to encourage cause lawyers to
"nurture sensibilities and skills compatible with a collective fight for
social change,"30 implying mutual and reciprocal relationships between
lawyer and client.
However, his consistent and thorough portrayal of most cause law-
yers as regnant lawyers raises the risk that a lawyer who is trying to be
rebellious will be so concerned about subordinating the client or client
community that the lawyer will forego a mutual relationship for one in
25. Id. at 24 (listing characteristics of a regnant lawyer).
26. Id. at 29.
27. Id. at 61.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Gerald Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious
Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989).
30. LOPEZ, supra note 9, at 38.
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which the lawyer is intentionally, and well-meaningly, subservient.' In
other words, the hyper-loyalty displayed by the rebellious, yet cautious
lawyer, causes her to recede in the relationship.
That is an understandable response by a cause lawyer who takes
Lopez's critique seriously, and who is aware of the demographics of
privilege within the legal profession. 3 2 Because it remains true that most
lawyers come from elite socioeconomic backgrounds, a self-reflective
cause lawyer would rightly be mindful that her elite background would
have generated life experiences that may not match up with those of her
"subordinated" clients. After reading Lopez, the cause lawyer would also
be mindful of the way in which her legal education privileged a particu-
lar kind of analysis-thinking like a lawyer-which may prime her to
see her client's issues through a limited problem-solving lens.33 Thus, in
an effort to make sure her regnant tendencies are kept in check, the cause
lawyer intentionally restrains the ways in which she participates with her
client so as not unintentionally to dominate the relationship.
The mutually engaged and reciprocal relationship coming from
Gary Bellow's vision of hyper-loyalty is, in some ways, turned on its
head, even though a version of hyper-loyalty is maintained. Under the
above indirect route to hyper-loyalty, the cause lawyer is motivated to
draw clear lines between "us" and "them" as a way to double check her
own regnant tendencies. Keeping a forceful distance from "them," the
non-subordinated, the elite, eases the cause lawyer's concerns that she
might be trumping her clients in some way.
There is an even stronger version of indirect hyper-loyalty as a re-
sponse to the risks of regnant lawyering. It is reflected by arguments of
some cause lawyers that they should overtly embrace a model in which
31. I am not the first scholar to suggest that Lopez portrays cause lawyers in an unnecessarily
bleak way. See Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer Out of Progressive Lawyering, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 213, 215 (1993).
32. DINOVITZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 20 (NALP Foundation for Law Career Research and
Education, Overland Park, KS, & American Bar Foundation, Chicago, IL 2004) (noting that "newly
admitted lawyers come generally from relatively privileged socioeconomic backgrounds"); see also
Sander & Yakowitz, supra, note 22, at 9-11.
33. LOPEZ, supra note 9, at 4-5 (describing his own experience at Harvard Law School); see
also STUART SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, Beating the Odds: Cause Lawyering and Legal Educa-
tion, in SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 51, 60-
71 (Stanford Univ. Press 2004); Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the
Interests ofJustice, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1929, 1931-36 (2002) (discussing the shift from the case
method to the clinical method of teaching and the benefits of the clinical approach); CHRIS
GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A JOURNALIST AT YALE LAW SCHOOL
245-55 (1st. ed. 1991) (describing the author's first experience in a clinical leaming environment);
ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND 53-54
(Routledge 1992); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 87-90 (Carnegie Foundation 2007); Gillian K. Hadfield, Equipping the Garage
Guys in Law, 70 MD. L. REV. 484, 487-90 (2011) (exploring the disconnect between attorneys and
clients due to the current state of legal education).
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lawyers must be subservient to "the people." 34 Under that view,
"[o]rganized masses of people, not lawyers, play the critical roles [in
social change], and the significant victories (or losses) occur outside the
sphere of law. The more that lawyers try to implement social change
directly, the more inimical their impact."35 Under this model of lawyer
loyalty as subservience, the risk of the regnant lawyering always is the
reality of lawyering. That is because lawyers are too versed in a "rights"
framing of social order, and that framing derives from and depends on
the power-maintaining legal system.36 Lawyers must step aside and sub-
ordinate rights "to the goal of building an authentic and unalienated po-
litical consciousness." It is through political awareness and action that
"the people" will create social change.38
Just as Lopez allowed for the possibility of a mutual and reciprocal
relationship between his rebellious lawyer and her client, so, too, do the
above lawyers. They call for cause lawyers to "seek to develop a rela-
tionship of genuine equality and mutual respect" with clients. 39 But, they
remain extremely nervous about the fact that lawyers are sanguine that
social change can happen through the power-maintaining legal system,
and their nervousness comes through. For example, there has been blunt
criticism of the development of federally funded legal aid as creating
merely a "poverty industry" for legal professionals. 4 0 Given the warnings
about lawyers' capture by the legal system, a cause lawyer committed to
social change by political organizing will want to avoid lawyer domina-
tion. The risk-averse way to do so is to understand the hyper-loyalty she
owes to her client as being unidirectional-that she is in service to, or
subservient to, her client.
As with the cause lawyer worried about being a regnant lawyer, this
variant on indirect hyper-loyalty calls on a cause lawyer to have a. strong
sense of "them" as a way of protecting cause clients. Thus, hyper-loyalty
comes from an inward focus that is concerned about creating a kind of
relationship between cause lawyer and cause client that protects the
cause client. In this setting, hyper-loyalty is less focused outwardly on
34. See Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 21-22 (1984) [hereinafter Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change]; see also Steve
Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change-Update Year 2010, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 499, 545-49 (2010) [hereinafter Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change-Update
Year 2010]; Gabel & Harris, supra note 9, at 375-79 (1982).
35. Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, supra note 34, at 4.
36. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 9, at 375 ("But the great weakness of a rights-oriented
legal practice is that it does not address itself to a central precondition for building a sustained politi-
cal movement-that of overcoming the psychological conditions upon which both the power of the
legal system and the power of social hierarchy in general rest.").
37. Id.
38. See Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, supra note 34, at 6.
39. Gabel & Harris, supra note 9, at 376.
40. Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change-Update Year 2010, supra note 34, at 548-
49 (quoting then-Congresswoman Edith Green using the phrase "poverty industry").
950 [Vol. 89:4
LAWYERS, LOYALTY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
concerns about whether the kind of cause relationship created produces
good advocacy or social change.
It is a deep irony that the very elite training received by many cause
lawyers actually can reinforce some of the forces that produce unidirec-
tional hyper-loyalty. At the same time that a cause lawyer may commit to
loyalty as service/subservience out of worry that she needs to keep her
elitist legal training in check, that same notion of lawyer loyalty as ser-
vice is embraced deeply by traditional, elitist legal training.41 It is as if a
peculiar feedback loop is created in which the cause lawyer reflects and
worries about her elitist training, chooses a conservative course of behav-
ior in response to that self-reflection, and that conservative course of
behavior is then reinforced by the very elitist training the lawyer was
trying to avoid.
That odd feedback loop can be seen by looking at Daniel
Markovits's recent endorsement of lawyer loyalty as service, crafting it
in terms of a lawyer's fidelity to her client.42 For Markovits, fidelity calls
on a lawyer to be "self-effacing" so that the "lawyer becomes able to
work continually as a mouthpiece for her client." 4 3 Further, the purpose
of the lawyer's self-effacement is rooted ultimately in goals of political
legitimacy and democratic participation." In other words, a lawyer is a
faithful mouthpiece for her client as a way of ensuring that the client is
able to genuinely and fully participate in the democratic processes of
which the adversary legal system is a part.45 The lawyer breaches that
fidelity, and that commitment to the client's full democratic participa-
tion, if the lawyer substitutes her own value judgments for those of the
client.46
The Markovits lawyer is anything but a rebellious lawyer.
Markovits valorizes the adversary legal system as the place in which all
kinds of disputes, including those related to social justice, are well re-
solved.47 For Markovits, the good lawyer focuses her work in the legal
41. A few prominent defenses of lawyer loyalty as service are: Norman W. Spaulding, Rein-
terpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 101-04 (2003); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 129-33 (President and Fellows of
Harvard College 1993); TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD
CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER'S ROLE (Ashgate, 2009); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE (Princeton Univ. Press, 2010). For a
helpful comparison of the differences between several loyalty as service models, see Katherine R.
Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 493, 505-21 (2011). Other de-
fenses of the standard conception of lawyering include Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits
ofthe Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics ofLawyering, 104 Yale L. J. 1545 (1995),
and MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (Matthew Bender,
2004).
42. MARKOVITS, supra note 41, at 90-99, 171-211.
43. Id. at 93.
44. Id. at ch. 8.
45. Id. at 184-190.
46. Id. at 185.
47. Id. at 190-99.
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system because it is a place in which members of society can receive
justice.48 She is effective only to the extent she shows a kind of loyalty to
her client that is unidirectional, and not mutual or reciprocal. The feed-
back loop is triggered for the well-intentioned, but cautious, rebellious
lawyer when she tries to subordinate herself to her client out of worries
about being a regnant lawyer, only to have such subordination magnified
by traditional conceptions of the role a regnant lawyer ought to play.
Worrying about lawyer domination is the second indirect route to
hyper-loyalty. In the second variation, the worry is that cause lawyers
will understand their true loyalty to be to the cause, and thus view their
clients as one of several pieces of an advocacy strategy to be deployed.
As a result, clients become pawns, not empowered individuals.49 Schol-
ars have listed several negative consequences they believe result from
such instrumental cause loyalty. Those include:
* Disempowering client communities, and disabling their potential
for political activism and leadership;50
* Dismissiveness of clients' true narratives; ' and
* Presumptuousness about law as an effective tool for social
change.52
Of course, there also exists a more benign form of hyper-loyalty fo-
cused on the cause. It understands there are clients who are as committed
to the cause as are the lawyers. The clients affirmatively wish to be
agents in a larger strategy for social change, and do not view themselves
as being used by the lawyers. In fact, the clients understand themselves
to be equally situated with the lawyers and frilly push back if they disa-
gree with the way in which the lawyers want to portray or use them as
the face of the cause.53
48. Markovits situates the legal adversary system within a larger political system that must be
understood as legitimate. Id at 173-76 The adversary system is one part of the practical, applied
way in which a democratic government can ensure its political legitimacy. Id. at 176-184.
49. See Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client Activism in Progressive Lawyering Theory, 16
CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 130 (2009) (summarizing critiques of cause lawyers, including their ascend-
ancy over clients); see also Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type: Categories of Cause Lawyer-
ing, 29 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 657, 680-81 (2004) (discussing the lawyer's role in the category of
cause lawyer Hilbink labels "elite/vanguard").
50. See Ashar, supra note 9, at 1918-20; Quigley, supra note 9, at 464-66; see also Stephen
Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049, 1055 (1970).
51. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 27-29 (1990); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L. J. 2107, 2111 (1991).
52. For a thoughtful summary of the debate, see Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode,
Public Interest Litigation: Insights From Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 606-07
(2009); see also Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the United States, 5
LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 11, 19 (2003) (discussing how lawyers believed litigation could be used to
establish a constitutional right to live).
53. I, and other cause lawyers, have understood that such clients exist and are sought after by
cause lawyers. See generally Cantrell, supra note 1. See also Bellow, supra note 4, at 302-04.
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Nonetheless, because of the loud volume of the warnings about
dominating cause lawyers, a well-intentioned cause lawyer may respond
by standing back-either by tempering her own commitment to the cause
or by assuming that it is more important to the client to focus on individ-
ual client interests if and when those interests should be in tension with
larger cause goals. Thus, should the client raise individual interests, the
well-intentioned cause lawyer would not try to persuade the client that
she should set individual interests aside for cause interests. To do so
would be to start down the slippery slope of lawyer domination. As with
the first indirect route to hyper-loyalty, the result for such a conscientious
cause lawyer is still hyper-loyalty, but a unidirectional, subservient ver-
sion that runs from the lawyer to the client.5 4
Taking the above descriptions of hyper-loyalty, it is important to
next more carefully examine a set of assumptions underlying hyper-
loyalty. The following section turns to that inquiry.
C. The Assumptions Underlying Hyper-Loyalty
Whatever the route to hyper-loyalty, one of its key goals is sup-
posed to be to assist cause lawyers and clients to achieve social change.
Built into that goal are two assumptions. First, that there is a particular
kind of relationship between cause lawyer and client that best facilitates
and coordinates their shared social change efforts. It is one in which
cause lawyers and clients are mutually engaged, with each acknowledg-
ing their own and the other's strengths and weaknesses. Second, that the
shared relationship between cause lawyer and client excludes the "other
side," whatever or whoever that may be at any particular time. In other
words, that social change advocacy is most effective when cause lawyers
and clients delineate clearly and firmly who is a friend and who is an
enemy.
The first assumption about the internal relationship between cause
lawyer and client is the one on which scholars and cause lawyers have
focused, and from which the ideal of hyper-loyalty was developed.55 It is
not surprising that if one compares descriptions of mutually engaged and
reciprocal relationships to those without such features, there is unani-
mous agreement that participants are more satisfied with mutually en-
gaged relationships.56 Scholars still fuss around the edges of what consti-
tutes effective mutual engagement. For example, arguing that under-
54. 1 do want to be clear that cause clients can interrupt both forms of unidirectional, subser-
vient hyper-loyalty. A cause client steeped in the ideal of hyper-loyalty, expecting her lawyer to
engage with her in the ways that Gary Bellow has articulated, could call out her cause lawyer's
subservient behavior and insist upon a mutual and reciprocal relationship. Note, however, that the
cause relationship is still infused with hyper-loyalty, just an ideal form, not an indirect form. The key
feature of hyper-loyalty still exists in the relationship-that both cause client and cause lawyer have
strong and unyielding notions of "us" and "them."
55. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
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standing features of particular contexts is critical when a cause lawyer
assesses how to remain "client-centered" in her work.57 Or, that cause
lawyers should focus more fully on situating legal work within "move-
ments of resistance," which might, themselves, lead with non-litigation
strategies. Or, that cause lawyers have paid insufficient attention to the
role of language in building or breaching cause loyalty with a client.59
Or, finally, that cause lawyers cannot truly establish hyper-loyalty unless
their work is also tied to community organizing.6 0 None of the fussing,
however, suggests any fault with the basic premise that mutual engage-
ment is better than unilateral engagement.
Notice, however, that the strong endorsement of the benefits of a
mutually engaged and reciprocal relationship does make problematic the
version of hyper-loyalty arising out of a well-intentioned subservience of
a cause lawyer to her client. Critically, subservient hyper-loyalty de-
prives both cause lawyer and client from the benefits of a robust conver-
sation. In social change work, at any given moment reasonable people
may disagree about the best strategy going forward. Cause lawyers may
disagree with each other, cause clients may disagree with cause lawyers,
and cause clients may disagree with each other. Those disagreements
arise from many sources--differences in background, differences in
training, differences in specialized knowledge, differences in prior expe-
rience on a related issue, differences in cognitive biases. Further, at any
given moment, different people may have relevant expertise. For one
decision-making moment, it may be that the client is the one with spe-
cialized knowledge, but in the next decision-making moment, it may be
the lawyer. Subservient hyper-loyalty deprives the group of an important
source of information and experience. Further, as Gary Bellow forth-
rightly noted, "Only a conception of clients as much weaker and manipu-
lable . . . dictates a level of subservience that leaves the lawyer without
her own vision and stake in the outcomes being pursued."6'
Turning now to the second assumption about the necessity of identi-
fying friends and foes. Upon critical examination, the assumption's flaws
surface. First consider a key feature of social change work. The work
requires cause advocates to regularly reassess strategies and to use multi-
ple advocacy methods. 6 2 In one moment, litigation may lead; in another,
57. Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Represen-
tation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 374 (2006).
58. Ashar, supra note 9, at 1879.
59. Ahmad, supra note 9, at 1045-46.
60. Quigley, supra note 9, at'456.
61. Bellow, supra note 4, at 304. For an assertive argument in favor of using strong persua-
sion with individual clients in a criminal defense setting, see Abbe Smith, The Lawyer's "Con-
science" and the Limits ofPersuasion, 36 HOFsTRA L. REV. 479, 481-81 (2007).
62. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 52, at 603; Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases on the
Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering
Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 333, 372-73 (2009); Marc L. Karin & Robin R. Runge, Toward Inte-
grated Law Clinics That Train Social Change Advocates, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 563, 568-69 (2011).
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legislative lobbying; in another, community organizing. Further, seldom
is it the case that only one advocacy method is in play at a time. 6 Most
often, cause advocates utilize multiple methods at the same time.
As a result, the "who," that is the "other side," is not static. While
litigation may have a technical plaintiff and defendant, cause litigation
generally has interested ancillary parties. As litigation develops, ancillary
parties may change from being supporters to opponents. Take some of
the recent education litigation as an example. In one lawsuit, challenging
school conditions in California, filed by the ACLU of Southern Califor-
nia, ancillary supporters included teachers and their union. However,
the ACLU of Southern California then alienated teachers and their un-
ions in a related lawsuit it filed challenging the way in which a school
district implemented teacher lay-offs.
Similarly, legislative work can result in groups who have had com-
peting interests coming together either to push for or oppose a particular
piece of legislation, even though the groups otherwise generally oppose
each other's missions. That same dynamic can come into play in com-
munity organizing. Thus, as a practical matter, understanding who one's
friends and enemies are is a fluid and dynamic process. But, robust no-
tions of loyalty between cause lawyers and clients create conditions that
encourage static notions of relationships. That, in turn, reduces the nim-
bleness necessary for cause lawyers and clients to perceive and pursue
opportunities for social change. I more fully describe the problem in the
next section.
II. THE HARMS OF HYPER-LOYALTY.
There are two helpful vantage points from which to consider the
harms that can flow from cause loyalty. One vantage point relates to the-
ories about decision making and problem solving. That vantage point
helps illuminate the ways in which cause lawyers and cause clients may
be subject to common decision-making errors because of the way hyper-
loyalty frames the decision-making processes. The other vantage point
relates to intentional choices available to cause lawyers and cause clients
about the ways in which they might helpfully choose to be in relationship
63. There has been a steady and long critique of cause lawyers as too focused on litigation.
See White, supra note 9, at 742. See generally LOPEZ, supra note 9. For a thoughtful summary of the
debate, see generally Cummings & Rhode, supra note 52.
64. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 443-44; Quigley, supra note 9 at 466-70; Ashar, supra note
9, at 1922, 1924-25; Cantrell, supra note 1, at 574-75.
65. For background on the case, the settlement, and the first year's enforcement, see generally
BROOKS M. ALLEN, ACLU FOUNDATION FOR S. CAL., THE WILLIAMS V. CALIFORNIA SETTLEMENT:
THE FIRST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION (2005),
http://www.decentschools.org/settlement/WilliamsReportWeb2005.pdf
66. See California Litigation, ACCESS QUALITY EDUCATION,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/ca/lit-ca.php3 (last visited June 14, 2012) (discussing Reed v.
Cahfornia).
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with others, but which they forgo because of their commitments to hy-
per-loyalty. I will take each vantage point in turn.
A. The Role of Cognitive Biases and Loyalty
Starting first with well-known information about cognitive heuris-
tics and bias. As is now well established, a notable feature of the way in
which we make decisions is our use of heuristics and biases, or "rules of
thumb," to quickly process information. As has also been thoroughly
demonstrated, those heuristics and biases can both help and impede accu-
rate decision making.68 Cause lawyers and cause clients are as prone to
cognitive bias as are any other decision makers. However, within the
cause lawyering relationship, those biases are triggered in particular
ways because the cause lawyer and cause client hold strong notions of
loyalty between themselves.
Consider one of the well-known biases: representativeness. The rep-
resentativeness bias posits that when people are asked to determine how
similar one thing is to another, they do so based on their own assess-
ments of resemblance rather than on more accurate probability assess-
ments.69 For example, if I see a very thin person and an average-weight
person both running on a path, I may assume that the thin runner is a
long-distance runner and the average-weight person is not. That is be-
cause the thin runner resembles marathon runners I have seen during the
Olympic Games, whereas the average-weight person does not. My as-
sumption is based on how close the thin runner comes to my own repre-
sentative image of marathon runners, not based on the mathematical
probability that across all thin and average-weight runners it is more like-
70ly that thin runners are long-distance runners.
Now consider cause lawyers and clients. Assume a low-income
community in which a brownfield is situated. The community members
have formed a neighborhood environmental justice group, which is being
represented by an environmental justice lawyer. Recently, some yuppies
have begun moving into the neighborhood and fixing up properties. The
environmental justice group and its lawyer are considering whether to
invite the yuppies to join the group.7 ' In this case, the environmental
67. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 19-23 (Yale Univ. Press 2008). The literature on cognitive
heuristics and biases is long and rich. My description of the field in this Article necessarily will be
short and summary. I will rely on a few sources to situate and support my summary, and readers who
are interested in undertaking a more thorough-going investigation of the field are encouraged to
review the bibliographies included in my source materials.
68. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 10-13 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2011).
69. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 26-277, 30-31; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note
68, at 149-53; PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING,
AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS 217-19 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2010).
70. For other examples, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 26-31.
71. The beginning of this fact pattern comes from Piomelli, supra note 21, at 401-02.
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justice lawyer worked with a different neighborhood group the year be-
fore and had the experience of a few more-resourced neighbors moving
in and co-opting the community group. From the lawyer's perspective,
the more-resourced neighbors then derailed the group's advocacy efforts.
Through the force of the representativeness bias, the lawyer is certain
that the current group of yuppies will have the same negative impact on
this second neighborhood group. He sees a resemblance between the two
groups, and focuses on that resemblance rather than on a more accurate
assessment of the likelihood that the two yuppie groups will behave simi-
larly. The cause lawyer's worries are magnified because of the hyper-
loyalty that he feels towards the community group and its cause. His
hyper-loyalty makes him focus on his concerns to such an extent that he
is rigid in his opposition to the yuppies, even in the face of facts that
suggest these yuppies are not like the others.
Further, the lawyer's certainty may not be checked by members of
the neighborhood group because of their own sense of hyper-loyalty with
the cause lawyer. Assume a mutual and reciprocal relationship between
the environmental justice lawyers and members of the neighborhood
group so that the lawyer is not carrying the day because he is bullying
group members. The conversations between the lawyer and group mem-
bers about the yuppies are engaged and fully participatory. Nonetheless,
group members feel hyper-loyalty to the lawyer and believe in the law-
yer's hyper-loyalty to them. That strong sense of loyalty means that they
give the benefit of the doubt to the lawyer. If the lawyer feels so strongly
about the yuppies, then there must be something there-whether that
"there" is based on cognitive bias or not.
Thinking about the above challenge in a slightly expanded form, it
is a challenge about the utility of stock stories.7 2 Stock stories are the
narrative version of the representativeness bias.73 Based on our lived
experiences, we create standardized narratives for what will transpire
given a certain set of facts. Gerald Lopez gives the example of the stock
story of "hailing a cab in Manhattan." He describes it as follows:
Walk outside to a street where cabs pass frequently, stand at the edge
of the sidewalk, wave to an unoccupied cab coming in your direction,
the cab (perhaps swerving radically to get there-it's Manhattan)
picks you up, tell the cabbie the destination, cabbie takes you (most
likely on an "entertaining" ride and hopefully by the most direct
route) there, pay (and tip or be castigated by) cabbie. 74
72. See Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First
Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REv. 1, 4-11 (2005); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering,
32 UCLA L. REv. 1, 3-9 (1984).
73. See, e.g., BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 69, at 219-22.
74. Lopez, supra note 72, at 6.
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Like all other cognitive heuristics, stock stories are both useful and
lead to error. For example, in the cab stock story, when one travels to
another location and presumes that the same stock story will apply, one
might find oneself stranded without a cab. For example, in smaller loca-
tions where the stock story for that area is phoning a specific request for
a cab.
Thinking through the use of stock stories in lawyering, scholars
have noted the risk of a lawyer imposing her own stock stories on the
facts rather than taking time to understand fully the perspectives of the
client." Notice how that concern interacts with hyper-loyalty to increase
the chances that cognitive bias will occur. It is not only lawyers who are
subject to stock stories, so are clients. But, a diligent cause lawyer aware
of the risk that she may deploy her stock stories in a way that trumps her
clients' concerns, might be inclined to dismiss her own stock stories.
Then, the diligent and loyal cause lawyer will focus on finding her cli-
ents' narrative, and her hyper-loyalty to her clients can cause her to fail
to subject the clients' narrative to the same scrutiny as she applied to her
own narrative. The result is that the lawyer fails to discover her clients'
erroneously-deployed stock story. Thus, the cause lawyer and client each
erroneously assess their situation because of the strength of hyper-
loyalty.
In writing about lawyer problem-solving, Linda Krieger and Paul
Brest have comprehensively catalogued the range of cognitive biases and
heuristics that impact lawyers and have noted that de-biasing efforts are
"largely ineffectual."76 As they consider the role of a lawyer as a "cogni-
tive counselor," they worry that client-centered models of lawyering,
while very respectful of client autonomy and participation, lead lawyers
and clients to fall more easily to cognitive biases.77 Given the ineffec-
tiveness of other de-biasing techniques, Krieger and Brest hold out the
most hope if lawyers fully engage their clients, yet also maintain some
distance.78 Presumably, they would also recommend the corollary to cli-
ents as a way for clients to navigate their lawyers' cognitive biases.
Translating the Krieger/Brest recommendation into relevant terms for
this Article, they would likely be skeptical that hyper-loyalty leads to
effective decision-making, and would recommend to cause lawyers and
75. See id. at 11-14; see also Stephen Ellmann et al., Narrative Theory and Narrative Prac-
tice, in LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 139-42
(Thomson Reuters 2009); Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients Stories, 12
CLINICAL L. REV. 329, 330-332 (2006); Angela Harris, Bad Subjects: The Practice of Theory and
the Constitution ofLegal Identity in Legal Culture, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 515, 522-23 (2003)
(discussing how legal projects "undertaken in the name of equality and respect silence those voices"
of subaltems, or socioeconomic outliers); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L. J. 2107, 2110-11, 2118-19 (1991) (discussing
the competing narratives of clients and lawyers in poverty law).
76. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 69, at 523-25.
77. Id. at 523-33.
78. Id. at 526, 533.
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clients that they reconsider whether hyper-loyalty helps to create actual
social change.
B. Relational Choices of Cause Lawyers and Cause Clients
Now consider the kinds of intentional choices that cause lawyers
and cause clients might make about their relationships with others, and
whether hyper-loyalty impedes some helpful relationships from forming.
This Article considers two possible constellations. The first is a calculat-
ed, instrumental choice by the cause lawyer and client to join with one
another because of an opportunistic and strategic assessment that such a
relationship will move the cause interest forward. Often, the strategic
relationship relates to a particular issue or project. The next is a choice
about relational advocacy-that the cause lawyer and client pay attention
to advocacy choices that are designed to build community more broadly.
While the examples are not exhaustive of intentional relational choices,
they do represent common choices available to cause lawyers and clients.
Starting with instrumental choices, an easy example is the earlier
one of an environmental justice neighborhood group joining with their
new yuppie neighbors. The groups are considering the collaboration be-
cause of geographic coincidence: the two sets of neighbors now share a
location and the location presents a problem. As noted before, cognitive
biases may influence whether the groups even will consider collaborat-
ing, but they still may make an intentional choice to join together on the
particular environmental issue related to their shared living space. Be-
cause of any number of perceived differences the groups have about each
other, one would expect that group collaboration would develop cau-
tiously and with concerns about whether the other group can truly be
trusted.
Under the best circumstances, group members would approach the
collaboration with inquisitiveness and openness.80 Members would ap-
proach differences of opinion not as moments of irresolvable conflict,
but as opportunities for reflective consideration and expression.8' Imag-
ining the ultimate ideal, the instrumental collaboration would lay the
foundation for an inclusive, long-term relationship, one that might even
lead to the dissolution of much of the sense of difference between
groups. For example, through learning about each other while working
on the environmental justice issue, community members might also dis-
cover that their neighborhood lacks an early childhood education pro-
79. 1 more fully consider what relational loyalty might look like in Part IV.
80. For this description, I am drawing upon the methodology created in the book by DOUGLAS
STONE, BRUCE PATTON & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: How TO DISCUSS WHAT
MATTERS MOST 25, 43 (Viking 1999). Under their methodology, the key is for discussants to shift
focus to a "learning stance," in which each side approaches a conversation curious about the other
side's "story." Id.
81. Id. at 200.
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gram (ECEP) within easy commuting distance and that is affordable. The
group might discover that some of their members would be interested in
developing a home-based ECEP that they would staff and run. The envi-
ronmental justice lawyer is able to connect the group to a community
economic development lawyer who will provide free legal services to get
the ECEP up and running, and then connect the group to another pro
bono lawyer who will provide ongoing advice on maintaining a non-
profit. 82 Then, when one of ECEP staffers mentions to a parent that she
took an interesting class at the local YMCA on children's nutrition, that
prompts the parent to organize a neighborhood kids gardening project,
using open spaces between sidewalks and the roadway. The neighbor-
hoods share the produce. Under the best circumstances, the instrumen-
tal relationship is only the first node in an ever-expanding web of rela-
tionships.
The challenge that hyper-cause loyalty presents to those best cir-
cumstances is that it structurally maintains separation between the two
groups, thereby reducing the possibility that an expanding web of rela-
tionships can occur. The environmental justice lawyer and the communi-
ty group have already formed a relationship with strong expectations
about loyalty, not only loyalty to each other but also loyalty together
against others. Hyper-loyalty serves as a way of protecting the lawyer-
client relationship, but it also builds out firm distinctions between insid-
ers and outsiders, friends and enemies. That then means the cause lawyer
and cause client can be disinclined to work robustly across lines for fear
of being seen as disloyal. As Gary Bellow has noted, "some of the most
complex tensions" in cause work come when the cause lawyer or client
tries to work with other decision makers or power holders.84 Further,
when the relationship being contemplated by cause lawyer and cause
client has a very instrumental purpose, hyper-loyalty can heighten the
sense of "otherness" because the starting reason for contemplating an
alliance is already very limited. Thus, the groups come into the collabo-
ration having framed it as a one-time, limited engagement with each oth-
er. The protective shell created by hyper-loyalty might show itself in a
myriad of subtle ways. The cause lawyer interrupting a meeting of the
two groups when the conversation strays away from the environmental
justice topic by saying, "Let's keep on topic everyone." The neighbor-
hood group and the yuppies each having their own group names with
82. My hypothetical is based in part on a real non-profit based in New Haven, Connecticut,
and called All Our Kin, which has received free legal support services, including non-profit advising
through Yale Law School's clinical program. See ALL OUR KIN, http://www.allourkin.org/index.php
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
83. This part of the hypothetical is based on the many youth urban garden projects going on
across the country. See, e.g., DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2012);
THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY GARDENING COLLABORATIVE, http://www.ecologycenter.org/bcgc/
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
84. Bellow, supra note 4, at 304-06.
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both being used in public communications instead of creating a shared
name. And so on.
Of course, the challenge above is neither immutable nor preor-
dained, as this Article will explore more fully in the next section. Group
members and their lawyers assuredly could craft a shared relationship
that is inquisitive and open, and that handles conflicts and difficult con-
versations as opportunities, not threats. My point here is that hyper-
loyalty makes that harder, not impossible.
Consider now whether the disinclination to form an expanding web
of relationships dissipates if the cause lawyer and cause client are com-
mitted to advocacy that includes community building. Examples of that
kind of work include legal work in service of union organizing,85 and
legal work in service of organizing of a particular, or in a particular,
community. Key to law and organizing is a commitment to the collec-
tive as a source of empowerment and power.88 Thus, at the outset, cause
lawyers and cause clients involved in law and organizing understand
themselves to be in relationship through a collective, and through con-
nections with others. Because of that commitment to relationship build-
ing, one might expect that hyper-loyalty would not hinder as much a
cause lawyer or cause client seeing the potential of building relationships
in unexpected directions. But, when one surveys descriptions of relation-
ship building in the law and organizing literature, one finds fairly stark
descriptions of friends and enemies, or "us" and "the other side." In other
words, what counts as "community building" has very strict boundaries;
the "us" might be larger, but there definitively is a "them" who should
not be trusted.
For example, in a wonderfully detailed and descriptive recounting
of law and organizing work with restaurant workers in New York City,
Sameer M. Ashar describes workers, organizers, and lawyers ("us")
moving forward against restaurant employers, federal courts, highly visi-
ble individuals who either owned local restaurants targeted by the work-
ers or were the head of corporate restaurant chains, and local and state
government officials ("the other side").89 However, over the course of
85. See Emily Rae Woods, Ned Burke: Labor Union Lawyer (In House), in BEYOND THE BIG
FIRM 159-66 (Alan B. Morrison & Diane T. Chin, eds., Aspen Publishers 2007) (describing the
career path of an in-house union lawyer and his commitment to core union organizing goals).
86. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 428-30; Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical
Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 460-65 (2001); Ashar, supra note 9, at
1879-80.
87. 1 am using this phrase loosely to refer to any kind of cause work in which organizing
plays a key role, even though there are often differences in focus, and sometimes tension, between
union organizing and other community organizing. See e.g., Gordon, supra note 9, at 423-27 (criti-
cizing unions for being focused only on bargaining for better contracts and for collaborating with
business); Ashar, supra note 9, at 1891-93 (noting the rise of community-organized workers centers
in response to the neglect of those workers by traditional unions).
88. See Quigley, supra note 9, at 455.
89. See Ashar, supra note 9, at 1889, 1898-99, 1911.
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the description of the advocacy campaign, people in one category never
move into the other.9 0
Similarly, in another stimulating article about creating a workers'
center for immigrant workers in Long Island, the "other side" includes
the following descriptions. Existing unions, with whom immigrant work-
ers had mixed results, were described as "do[ing] nothing" for the work-
ers. 9' Employees of federal and state labor-related agencies are described
as "often systematically block[ing] claims made by immigrants, effec-
tively preventing these claims from being addressed by the proper au-
thorities . . . allow[ing] them to act as keepers of the gates, turning per-
sonal animosity against immigrants into policy." 92 Further, workers who
came to the center for help would not receive legal services until they
were "willing to fight collectively" and participate in the center's larger
organizing campaign, creating the possibility that a worker could turn
from insider to outsider if she decided against organizing work.93 Again,
outsiders do not become insiders over the course of the story, and the
implied message from the strongly negative descriptions is that outsiders
are irredeemable. 94
Of course, when organizing a community, one reasonably needs to
prioritize efforts. Organizing does not happen because of a magic com-
munity-building wand; it takes hard, sustained, persevering work. As one
organizer describes it, community building includes, "consistent frustra-
tion ... with its petty disputes, confusion, personality problems and the
like."95 It makes sense to figure out which folks can stand together most
easily to start and then to move outward from there. It also makes sense
to tie closely the use of scarce legal resources to larger goals of commu-
nity building to ensure that individual work is coordinated with group
goals. What hyper-loyalty does to that reasonable process of prioritizing,
however, is to make more rigid and impermeable what should be a more
fluid sense of who the community is.
For example, when a worker chooses not to participate in organiz-
ing, the lens of cause loyalty too quickly views the worker's decision as
betrayal. The rationale might go something like this: "The rest of us have
come together and have been putting in time and effort to make safer
90. There is a necessary caveat to my conclusion. I am drawing it from a description that
necessarily truncates a much larger, more nuanced, lived history of an advocacy campaign. Any
advocacy campaign may very well have included moments of building unexpected relationships that
did not make it into the description. I am not trying to create a "cardboard" cut-out of law and organ-
izing, to borrow Kate Kruse's phrase. But, I am trying to highlight how much descriptions of that
work refer to features I have identified as belonging to hyper-loyalty.
91. Gordon, supra note 9, at 413.
92. Id. at 420.
93. Id. at 443-44.
94. See supra notes 91-93. I add the same caveat to this description that I noted about the
organizing campaign for restaurant workers.
95. Quigley, supra note 9, at 458 (quoting community organizer Ron Chisom).
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workplaces for all of us. If you are not willing to put in the same time
and effort as the rest of us, then that must mean you do not support our
goals. If you do not support our goals, you stand against us." Hyper-
loyalty prefers to understand the world as friends and enemies, thereby
diminishing the chance that "friends" will understand the declining
worker to have been motivated by a myriad of other possible benign rea-
sons such as fear, or uncertainty about what organizing entails, or ex-
haustion from a too-long workday. The risk, then, is that the declining
worker is left out of further conversations or efforts even though her wor-
ries may very well be able to be assuaged, and she could be eventually
brought into the organizing work.96 So, too, the employer labeled an "en-
emy," remains an enemy, even if further conversation would have re-
vealed productive possibilities for engagement.
If current expressions of hyper-loyalty are too rigid, then what
might a more expansive version of loyalty look like, and how would it
increase the relationality that this Article has argued is so critical to ef-
fective social change work? It is to those questions that the next section
turns.
III. RELATIONAL LOYALTY
First, relational loyalty does not mean lessening a lawyer's duty of
confidentiality. A cause lawyer and client, or client group, will still
share information with each other forthrightly and freely, with clients
assured that their communications will not be disclosed to others without
their consent. Further, given that what the cause lawyer says to her cli-
ents may be as sensitive as what the clients say to the cause lawyer, a
careful cause lawyer will take time with her clients to talk through vari-
ous consequences to the clients and the cause of the clients disclosing the
lawyer's communications.98 The idea of relational loyalty is not to create
a less-trusting relationship between cause lawyer and client; it is to create
for both lawyer and client a more expansive web of relationships within
which to create social change.
96. Here I want to be careful not to caricature organizing work. I fully acknowledge that a key
component of all good organizing training is working through community members' reluctances and
worries about organizing. I am not trying to suggest that an organizer could not, or would not, en-
gage with a reluctant worker to try and convince her to join in the organizing efforts. My suggestion
is more modest-that hyper-loyalty mutes those efforts.
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.6 (2010), ("A lawyer shall not reveal in-
formation relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .").
98. Recall that Rule 1.6 obligates the lawyer to preserve confidences, but does not place a
similar obligation on a client. Similarly, the evidentiary privilege between attorney and client is held
by the client, and an unaware client can easily waive the privilege unintentionally. Arthur Best,
EVIDENCE 198 (7th ed. 2009) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is waived if a client inadvert-
ently reveals a private communication had with an attorney without acting reasonably to prevent
disclosure or taking prompt remedial steps).
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A. A Web ofRelationships
Actively looking for and creating a web of relationships requires
cause lawyers and clients to concentrate more on the situations in which
they are working than on the dispositions of the people involved. In other
words, cause lawyers and clients must be prepared to examine all others
in ways other than constitutively as friends or enemies. Drawing on the
work of situationist scholars, the current patterned thinking of cause ad-
vocates and clients is to view those who are like-minded as good people,
and those who are not as bad people, and to reject the possibility that
specific features of the situation are the reason that someone is like-
minded or not.99 As noted earlier, hyper-loyalty exacerbates cognitive
biases, like attributions to disposition as opposed to situation. But, ac-
tively looking to create an expansive web of relationships pushes cause
lawyers and clients to consider the situation as creating behavior.
For example, a cause lawyer and her clients who are looking to
change the pace at which local government benefits offices process ap-
plications might consider the role played by specific situations faced by
department line employees in causing application delays instead of vili-
fying those line employees as elites who hate poor people. Paying atten-
tion to the situation may reveal factors that encourage building a connec-
tion with another. Maybe several department line employees share the
same interviewing space, which creates pressure to move through appli-
cant interviews quickly and curtly. Understanding the line employees to
be connected in the web of relationships could result in efforts to create
an expanded workspace, which may then give line employees more time
with applicants. 00
A powerful historical example of this kind of relational advocacy is
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s work to build a "beloved community."' 1 King
repeatedly reminded advocates that maintaining a generalized hostile
stance against all non-Black community members would fail to bring
about long-term, steadfast social change.102 As King noted in his Letter
99. For a thorough-going introduction to situationism, see generally Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Eco-
nomics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003).
100. Having been a poverty lawyer, I know very well that my example can be pressed. What
state agency really has the extra space contemplated by my hypothetical? If an agency had such
space, why would it agree to give more over to benefits offices than to other needs? I agree that there
are challenges to my hypothetical, but notice how many of the objections start from the presumption
that the state's actors could never be believed to behave in a way conducive to anti-poverty work.
Those objections start from the same dispositionist presumption that this Article asserts is unhelpful.
101. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Power of Nonviolence, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE:
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 12 (James M. Washington
ed., 1986) [hereafter A TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
102. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Nonviolence and Racial Justice, in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 7 ("A second point is that nonviolent resistance does not seek to defeat
or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and understanding."); id at 10 ("In your struggle
for justice, let your oppressor know that you are not attempting to defeat or humiliate him, or even to
pay him back for injustices that he has heaped upon you. Let him know that you are merely seeking
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From a Birmingham Jail, "I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all
communities and states. ... We are caught in an inescapable network of
mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one di-
rectly affects all indirectly."'10 3 King's commitment to a beloved commu-
nity stemmed from his theological understandings,' but it also allowed
him to apprehend that greater social change was possible when one un-
derstood that people who acted badly in certain situations could still
change their behaviors when pressed into other situations. 05 A relational
sense of cause loyalty would mean that when a cause lawyer or cause
client suggests building an unexpected relationship, she would not be
considered disloyal, but would be understood as exploring whether there
justice for him as well as yourself. Let him know that the festering sore of segregation debilitates the
white man as well as the Negro."); id. at 14 ("God grant that as men and women all over the world
struggle against evil systems they will struggle with love in their hearts, with understanding good
will. Agape says you must go on with wise restraint and calm reasonableness but you must keep
moving. We have a great opportunity in America to build here a great nation, a nation where all men
live together as brothers and respect the dignity and worth of all human personality.")
103. Id. at 290
104. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
chs. 3-4 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1998) (describing his introduction to nonviolence through Mohan-
das Gandhi, the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, and his work with Dr. Edgar Brightman and Dr. L.
Harold DeWolf). See generally KENNETH L. SMITH & IRA G. ZEPP, JR., SEARCH FOR THE BELOVED
COMMUNrTY: THE THINKING OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 11 (Judson Press 1974).
I also want to note here examples of "beloved communities" coming from other religious
traditions. For example, Buddhism contains the concept of "dependent arising"-an account of
interconnectedness between all things. See HUSTON SMITH & PHILIP NOVAK, BUDDHISM: A
CONCISE INTRODUCTION 61 (2003). Judaism contains a moral obligation to "deem all of another's
concerns as weighty as one's own." LENN E. GOODMAN, LOVE THY NEIGHBOR As THYSELF 13
(2008). In the Catholic tradition, the Focolare Movement is based on the "spirituality of unity,"
which calls on a person to be a "gift for the other." Donald W. Mitchell, The Spirituality of Unity: A
Gift for Our Times, Remarks at Fordham Law School (April 5, 2011) (manuscript on file with au-
thor); see also CHIARA LUBICH, ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 3 (Michel Vandeleene ed., 2007) (through the
spirituality of unity, people are trying to become "the seeds of a new people that promotes a world of
greater solidarity especially with the poorest and weakest, a world more united"); id., at 280-81
(living a "culture of giving . . . could seem difficult, arduous, or heroic, [b]ut it is not, because the
human person, made in the image of God who is love, finds fulfillment precisely in loving, in giv-
ing"). See generally THOMAS MASTERS & AMY UELMEN, FOCOLARE: LIVING A SPIRITUALITY OF
UNITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) (describing US applications and projects). See generally,
Deborah J. Cantrell, What's Love Got to Do with It?: Contemporary Lessons on Lawyerly Advocacy
from the Preacher Martin Luther King, Jr., 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 296 (2010) (discussing across
multiple religious traditions the concept of "love of neighbor" and applying it as a lawyerly value).
105. This situationist account of Dr. King comes from Jon Hanson, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
Situationism, THE SITUATIONIST BLOG, http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2008/01/20/1661/ (Jan.
22, 2007). Of course, changed behavior can come either voluntarily or coercively. Coerced social
change comes with the worry that the bad behavior has not been eliminated, but redirected into a less
obvious, but equally nefarious, channel. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of
Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2011) (giving a detailed historical account
of civil rights advocacy strategies that led to disparate impact, including strategic choices about the
potential for driving discrimination underground if civil rights agendas were crammed down on
employers). It may also be the case that some "bad" behavior is unconscious. See, e.g., Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Curtis Hardin & Alexander J. Rothman, Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & SoC'L PSYCH. 272 (1993) (one of the early studies capturing the effects of non-
conscious or implicit bias). Dr. Banaji is a leading researcher on implicit bias and is part of a larger
group of researchers focused on that topic. See PROJECT IMPICIT,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/backgroundinformation.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). 1 ad-
dress those concerns in more detail in Section V.
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is a moment to expand helpfully the web of relationships needed to cre-
ate social change.10 6
B. An Approach of Curiosity
A related feature of relational loyalty is that cause lawyers and
cause clients would approach other actors/participants with curiosity and
not with animosity or with an advocacy agenda to start. This feature
comes directly from the negotiation field. 07 As one set of researchers has
observed, "[c]hanges in attitudes and behavior rarely come about because
of arguments, facts, and attempts to persuade."' 08 Instead, starting from a
genuine "stance of curiosity" allows each conversant to focus truly on
listening to the other side.' 0 9
For example, curiosity requires participants to inquire about the
other's intentions, and not presume them."10 That can be key in cause
work given the propensity to frame a setting as "us" and "them," and the
resulting propensity to presume bad intentions on the part of "them.""'
Curiosity also requires participants to be conscious about the ways in
which they frame questions so that a question is not a cross-examination
or an advocacy statement, but is a genuine inquiry: i.e., asking the agen-
cy person, "What would make it easier for a benefits worker to be able to
have enough time for an initial interview?" instead of stating, in dis-
guised question form, "You would agree, wouldn't you, that benefits
workers must have more time for initial interviews?"ll 2 Finally, curiosity
calls on participants to separate acknowledging points made by the other
106. For an example of unexpected transnational labor collaboration spurred by the adoption of
new international law, see generally Tamara Kay, Legal Transnationalism: The Relationship Be-
tween Transnational Social Movement Building and International Law, 36 L. & SOC'L INQUIRY 419
(2011). 1 also understand the social change model of building a web of relationships to share as its
distant cousin theories of democratic constitutionalism in which change advocates, courts, and
legislators are all in relationship to each other in a dynamic contest over norms. See Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
373, 381-87 (2007); see also Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (2008) (arguing that Supreme Court dissents are an example of "demosprudence," which
understands there to be a relationship of dialogue between the "lawmaking power of legal elites and
the equally important, though often undervalued, power of social movements or mobilized constitu-
encies to make, interpret, and change law"). Democratic constitutionalism remains a distant cousin
to my approach in large part because it implicitly understands membership in any of the groups as
impermeable. One is a member of the legal elite or a social movement, and one cannot, or does not,
cross over.
107. See STONE, PATTON & HEEN, supra note 80, at 167-83.
108. Id. at 137.
109. Id. at 166-68; see generally Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 115 (2007) (asserting that cultural beliefs are resistant to change and positing that change
might be assisted by creating the most robust marketplace of culturally-related positions); Russell G.
Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of
Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LTTrLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (introducing the idea
of "relational self-interest" as a way of bridging differences and seeing another's perspective).
110. See STONE, PAT7ON & HEEN, supra note 80, at 48-50.
111. Id. at 46 ("The conclusions we draw about intentions based on the impact of others'
actions on us are rarely charitable.").
112. See id. at 172-77 for further examples.
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side from agreeing with the other side. 1 3 Thus, a participant understands
that she can acknowledge a challenge presented by the other side without
agreeing with the conclusion the other side reaches based on the chal-
lenge.
For cause lawyers and clients who understand themselves as en-
gaged in an important advocacy campaign for social change, stepping
back from an advocacy stance can be challenging. The point of the work,
after all, is to convince others to change. The worry is that taking a
stance, other than as an advocate, might easily be misconstrued as giving
in, or as signaling weakness. Hyper-loyalty feeds in to the idea that an
advocacy stance is the way in which one signals strong solidarity with
one's cause client, or one's cause lawyer. Imbuing loyalty with a sense of
curiosity towards the other helps to move it towards a way of engaging
with others that ultimately permits more effective advocacy.
C. An Approach of Compassion
A final feature of relational loyalty is cultivating compassion. It is
certainly consonant with building a web of relationships and approaching
others with curiosity. By compassion, I mean a willingness to try actively
to understand another's position or conduct without vilifying the position
or the person. Further, compassion requires a participant to meet hostility
or other negative reactions with a reaction designed to de-escalate-
although de-escalation does not mean capitulation.114
Compassion does not require agreeing with, or excusing another's
position or conduct. A humorous vignette by noted insight meditation
expert Sharon Salzberg helps illustrate the point. Salzburg describes a
rickshaw trip to the train station in Kolkata (Calcutta) India in which a
person tried to assault her from the street. She avoided being pulled from
the rickshaw, and when she recounted the event to her teacher, he ex-
claimed that "with all of the lovingkindness in [her] heart," she should
have taken her umbrella "and hit that man over the head with it."" 5 As
Salzburg goes on to explain, compassion requires one to live with "sym-
pathy for all living beings," which allows a person "to name injustice
without hesitation, and to act strongly, with all the skill at our dispos-
al."ll6 I emphasize the final component because what often constitutes
"naming injustice" in social change work is expressing righteous anger-
a response that emphasizes divides and differences between people or
113. Id. at 180-83.
114. See Deborah J. Cantrell, Can Compassionate Practice Also Be Good Legal Practice?:
Answers from the Lives ofBuddhist Lawyers, 12 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 1, 73-74 (2010) (noting
the critical role compassion plays for Buddhist lawyers and that a key feature of compassion is
understanding, not avoiding conflict or capitulating to demands).
115. SHARON SALZBERG, LOVINGKINDNESS: THE REVOLUTIONARY ART OF HAPPINESS 131
(Shambhala Publications, Inc. 1995).
116. Id. at 131-32 (emphasis added).
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groups. In contrast, when using the skill of compassionate response, in-
justice is still identified clearly and forthrightly, but with an eye towards
identifying the myriad of conditions on which the particular situation
depends so that opportunities for change might be identified." 7
When compassion is joined with curiosity, participants increase
their capacity to comprehensively and accurately map out the full con-
tours of the situation for which a solution must be crafted."' 8 That com-
prehensive map is more likely to illuminate unexpected ways forward
than is a map created by participants who only distrust and dislike each
other. Of course, the fact of creating a more comprehensive map of the
situation does not itself guarantee that participants will find a solution.
Creating a comprehensive map comes at the beginning of the process,
and there will still be hard work ahead. During that hard work, it is likely
that participants will have to rejigger their map many times as the situa-
tion develops and changes. Each time, that rejiggering will benefit from
compassion, curiosity, and an effort to build out a web of relationships.
IV. Is THIS A RISKY UTOPIAN VISION OF CAUSE LAWYERING?
The foundational principles of this Article insist that social change
is more likely to happen, or happens more thoroughly, when advocates
work to build a web of relationships, and approach all others with curios-
ity and compassion. Those engaged in social change work may worry
that the risks of failure presented by the approach are too high and the
consequences too grave. More particularly, those skeptical of the ap-
proach may worry on a few related fronts. First, that the approach places
elite cause lawyers in a position in which it is too easy for them to be co-
opted by the existing legal and political systems. Relatedly, that power
dynamics in our society are structured in an intractable way that pre-
cludes building true relationships between those with power and those
without. Finally, that social change work requires there to be a group that
understands itself to have a grievance against others outside the group.
Thus, a sense of "otherness" is a necessary precursor to social change
work. The Article takes up each of those worries in turn.
Recall the earlier discussion of rebellious lawyering and its concern
that predominantly elite cause lawyers are unable to step back and em-
power their clients to take the lead in developing and implementing an
advocacy strategy."' 9 If cause lawyers are affirmatively to build a web of
117. See id.
118. A training technique built from the combination of curiosity and compassion is "parallel
universes." Created by Susan Bryant and Jean Kob Peters, the technique calls on the lawyer to create
several parallel universes in which a different reason explains the client's conduct in each universe.
In that way, a lawyer is reminded that any given outcome generally has multiple explanations or
contexts. See generally Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in
Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001).
119. See discussion infra Part lB.
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relationships, the worry is that they will focus on building relationships
within the existing legal and political systems. As one activist described
it, lawyers:
[A]re trained to understand and be comfortable with the system even
when they criticize it. Almost all lawyers, including community law-
yers, want to succeed in the system. They want money, power, politi-
cal advantage, respect or whatever their individual dreams are.
Therefore, confronting the system or raising hell makes the lawyer
very uncomfortable because it is not how the lawyer was trained to
deal with the system, and the lawyer, without realizing it, is chal-
lenged individually because the lawyer is part of the system. 120
Even benignly, elite cause lawyers who are conscientious about not
dominating clients may subtly or unconsciously signal to clients that the
best way for the clients to use the lawyer is to work within the system
and to leave the lawyer out of those activities designed to challenge the
system.121 Given that the point of building a web of relationships is to
accelerate the possibility of change, it is a bad consequence indeed if
building the web results instead in the cooptation of social change and
the reinforcement of the status quo.122
There are several countervailing efforts that cause lawyers and
cause clients must bring to bear to avoid cooptation. The first is that both
cause lawyers and cause clients must explicitly, intentionally, and mutu-
ally commit to the "web of relationships" or "relational loyalty" advoca-
cy approach. There can be no unspoken assumptions between lawyer and
client about what each other's motivations are, what assumptions are
being made, and upon what predictions are being relied. The work en-
gaged in by lawyer and client goes beyond simple technical efforts to
comply or enforce the law, and it requires the lawyer and client to insist
that the "moral perspective" of the work is transparently a part of the
conversation. 12 3 Further, cause lawyers and cause clients must understand
120. Quigley, supra note 9, at 459 (quoting community organizer, Ron Chisom).
121. For a succinct and useful historical account of lawyers' dominance within the political
system, see Robert W. Gordon, Are Lawyers Friends of Democracy?, in THE PARADOX OF
PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 31, 33 (Scott L. Cummings, ed.,
2011). To compare with accounts of lawyers and activists using the courtroom as political theater,
see Gabel & Harris, supra note 9, at 379-89. The seminal critique of elite cooptation of social
movements was issued in FRANCES PIvEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 297-300 (1977) (assessing the welfare rights social move-
ment and concluding that grassroots, activist protest work was co-opted by elite lawyers who were
most comfortable using a court-based, litigation-focused strategy built on existing legal structures).
122. For an interesting case study of how elites can both help and hinder social movement
work, see Douglas Neiaime, Convincing Elites, Controlling Elites, 54 STUD. LAW, POL. & SOC'Y
175, 195-196 (2011) (considering elite impact in the U.S. marriage equality campaign).
123. See Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225,
268-270 (2006) (arguing that moral dimensions permeate most work between lawyer and client and
that competent lawyering cannot happen without explicitly engaging those moral dimensions); see
also Kruse, supra note 17, at 111 (arguing that current legal norms result in lawyers inappropriately
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that they both are capable of robust moral conversations and that disa-
greement does not mean disloyalty. 124 Just as they are meeting others
with curiosity and compassion, so too, must they meet each other.125
Cause lawyers and cause clients also must commit themselves to self-
reflecting on their own actions, both as a way of checking and analyzing
one's own behavior and also as a way of trying to build out a set of good
habits needed for a web-of-relationship approach to advocacy. 12 6
Again, I am not asserting that the approach is effective and easy. I
am asserting, however, that the challenges that will come up between
cause lawyers and cause clients, and between both as to others, are navi-
gable and surmountable. Nonetheless, the approach cannot be pursued
successfully if pursued half-heartedly. Then again, social change work,
in whatever its variety, has never been easy. So, if cause lawyers and
cause clients are going to be working hard no matter, better to work hard
using a model that offers more hope for change.
I now turn to the second concern: that the power differential be-
tween those in control and those pushing for social change precludes any
kind of true mutual relationship. As a result, cause lawyers and cause
assuming their clients are motivated only by self-interest instead of a broader range of moral com-
mitments).
124. Recall Gary Bellow's warning to cause lawyers not to err by assuming their clients are
weak and manipulable, and his description of his own vigorous conversations with clients. Bellow,
supra note 4, at 297 300, 303-304. As Ascanio Piomelli has described it, "An essential aspect of
collaboration is fully engaging with clients and groups: listening, but also challenging; learning, but
also teaching; allowing others to reach different conclusions, but sometimes voicing disagree-
ment . . . ." Piomelli, supra note 21, at 471.
125. For those concerned about an approach calling for mutual engagement, this is often the
moment where the concern is raised about the possibility of a cause lawyer and cause client reaching
a complete impasse. The unspoken assumption is that such irresolvable impasses will happen so
often, and that the risk to client individual autonomy is so great, that any model of mutual engage-
ment between lawyer and client is inappropriate. Note that this concern applies to all lawyer-client
relationships, whether the work is social change or private interests. Many scholars, including me,
have considered how mutual engagement and client autonomy can work in harmony, and for pur-
poses of this Article, I take that point as already having been well-articulated. See generally, Kathe-
rine R. Kruse, supra note 17; Vischer, supra note 123; Cantrell, supra note 104.
126. There are many, many ways in which one might practice self-reflection, and I mention
only two possible approaches here. One comes from the literature on mindfulness and lawyering, in
which techniques such as mindfulness meditation are used to train good habits of attention and
awareness. Exemplary of that approach is the work of Len Riskin. See Leonard L. Riskin, Further
Beyond Reason: Emotions, the Core Concerns, and Mindfulness in Negotiation, 10 NEV. L. J. 289,
314-15 (2010); Leonard L. Riskin, Mindfulness: Foundational Training for Dispute Resolution, 54
J. LEGAL EDUC. 79, 83-85 (2004); Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential
Benefits of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 23-27 (2002). For an example of social change lawyers using mindfulness in their work, see
Angela Harris, Margaretta Lin & Jeffrey Selbin, From the "Art of War" to "Being Peace": Mind-
fulness and Community Lawyering in a Neoliberal Age, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2073, 2114-15 (2007). The
second approach comes from the literature related to legal clinical pedagogy, in which the role of
self-reflection for good student learning has been extensively studied. Some examples include J.P.
Ogilvy, The Use ofJournals in Legal Education: A Toolfor Reflection, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 55, 60
(1996); RoY STUCKEY, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 127-
28 (2007), available at http://www.cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/best practices-full.pdf (not-
ing that self-directed learning requires that a student not "only learn something, but . . . reflect criti-
cally on the extent of her or his learning").
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clients must understand those in power as adversaries because to do oth-
erwise risks easy cooptation, or worse. Social movement history in this
country provides cautionary examples of power's easy ability to trump
agitators-think of any number of examples of violent suppression of
labor organizing,127 or violent uses of force during civil rights boy-
cotts. 12 8 Further, power also brings with it the power to ignore. If those in
power do not acknowledge opposition, then there is a risk that such op-
position is not seen as being a part of the contest at all. Thus, if one be-
lieves that the risks of cooptation or of being ignored are high, then one
might determine that the best strategy for change is to place oneself or
one's community in high and visible opposition to the "other." More
succinctly, to embark upon a strategy exactly contrary to the approach
recommended in this Article. Consider two examples of that strategy-
one from the left and another from the right.
First, an example from the left: In March 1987, AIDS activists in
New York City came together to form the group, ACT UP. ACT UP
staged its first protest on Wall Street on March 24, 1987.129 The day be-
fore the protest, one of ACT UP's original members, Larry Kramer, had
an editorial published in the New York Times titled "The F.D.A.'s Cal-
lous Response to AIDS." 30 In the editorial, Kramer excoriated the FDA
for being "intransigent in the face of this monstrous tidal wave of death."
He then called out national and local government administrations saying
that "when the histories of the Reagan and Koch administrations are
truthfully written, this scandal will dwarf the political corruption in New
York and the foreign policy blunders in Washington.""'' Kramer's blunt,
if not hyperbolic, writing became exemplary of ACT UP's rigorous and
confrontational approach to direct action. In an interview for ACT UP's
oral history project, Kramer noted that he became known as "the Angri-
est Gay Man in the World." 3 2 He also described his efforts to push ACT
UP to become "more militant" and to understand itself as "an army,"
including getting members to take shooting practice."3
127. See generally PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN
AMERICA 323-28 (1st ed. 2010) (detailing labor unrest and response in unionizing development in
America).
128. See, e.g., KING, JR., supra note 104, at 78-82 (describing responses to the Montgomery,
Alabama bus boycott during which Dr. King's house was bombed).
129. ACT UP 1987 Wall Street Action, ACT UP,
http://www.actupny.org/documents/1stFlyer.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (recreating the flyer of
the first ACT UP action on March 24, 1987 for a "Massive AIDS Demonstration").
130. Larry Kramer, The F.D.A's Callous Response to AIDS, N. Y. TIMES, March 23, 1987, at
A19.
131. Id.
132. Interview by Sarah Schulman with Larry Kramer, ACT UP Oral History Project (Nov. 15,
2003) at 14, available at http://www.actuporalhistory.org/interviews/images/kramer.pdf.
133. Id. at 16.
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Picking up on Kramer's theme of ACT UP standing in clear opposi-
tion to the establishment, another early member of ACT UP described
the group as follows:
ACT UP, the organization, does exactly what its name says. We do
demonstrations, and act in such a way that the authorities (and in this
case we mean government officials, researchers, politicians, the
church and the law) feel is inappropriate but ultimately accomplishes
our goal by bringing into focus the problems which they are unwill-
ing or afraid to address.134
ACT UP demonstrations included chants that highlighted themes
like being at war or in a fight. For example, at the group's second anni-
versary protest in March 1989, protestors chanted, "We'll never be silent
again, ACT UP, we'll never be silent again, ACT UP, fight back, fight
AIDS . . . .' Similarly, at an October 1988 demonstration outside of
the FDA's office in Washington, DC, protestors chanted, "Forty-two
thousand dead of AIDS, where was the FDA, seize control, seize control,
seize control." 36
Next, an example from the right: the Thomas More Law Center
(TMLC).' 37 TMLC focuses its advocacy efforts on supporting school
districts in teaching "intelligent design" in science courses instead of
evolution.138 TMLC has portrayed itself as being deeply and inexorably
"within a grand narrative of oppression and resistance" to the mainstream
political and cultural power structures.139 Thus, TMLC has crafted a kind
of heroic resistance narrative that calls on its members to stand firmly
against "the other."
Both ACT UP and TMLC made a similar calculation. First, that a
call to a kind of "hyper hyper-loyalty" better mobilizes supporters than
does an approach that suggests there are any affinities between a group's
supporters and other groups. Second, that this hyper hyper-loyalty is a
very effective way to banish the risk of cooptation because it insists that
there could never be any common ground, ever, with the other side.
Thus, there is no reason to talk with anyone or any group that is not al-
ready committed to issues in the same way as the group. For ACT UP,
the point was not to negotiate with the FDA for any possible change in
the approval process for AIDS-related medications, from the smallest to
134. Jon Greenberg, ACT UP Explained, ACT UP,
http://www.actupny.org/documents/greenbergAU.htmi (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
135. Detailed Scenes: Fight Back, Fight Aids, ACT UP,
http://www.actupny.org/divatv/synopsis75.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (transcript of video
documentary by James Wentzy).
136. Id.
137. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REv. 941, 978 83 (2011)
(describing Thomas More Law Center's approach to litigating "intelligent-design" education cases).
138. Id. at 978-79.
139. Id. at 980 (internal citations omitted).
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the most significant. The point was to demand full capitulation by the
FDA. In fact, ACT UP splintered when some of its members were per-
ceived as agreeing to negotiate with the FDA and big pharmaceutical
companies. 140 Similarly, the point of TMLC is not to accept any possible
revisions to evolutionary teaching, but to accept only full use of an intel-
ligent design curriculum. Under such a model, change only happens
when it is crammed down on the other side, and change is an all or noth-
ing proposition.
In some ways, the purity of the above approach is alluring. It offers
up a simple narrative that there is a right way and a wrong way. There
are no uncertain margins in which hard cases exist. Thus, there is no rea-
son to be curious about conversing with someone who holds another
position. It is better just to be a strong advocate. But the very features of
that all-or-nothing approach that makes its group impermeable to coopta-
tion and invisibility, also makes it impermeable to expansion. As de-
scribed earlier, advocacy is often the least likely way to change a per-
son's mind on an issue. The situation always is perceived as if it were a
zero sum game, with winners and losers. Thus, standoffs, not change, are
the more likely result.
Contrast the ACT UP/TMLC approach with another example from
social movement work that provides a different understanding of power:
a dynamic vision in which all actors have power, and power can be used
to create space for a new, engaged dialogue and "to expand the sites,
means, and agents of persuasion."141 Concretely, I turn again to Martin
Luther King, Jr. King, who insisted on calling out immoral and uncon-
scionable behavior, including calling out the passivity and cooptation of
black and white churches. 142 But, he did so adamantly and unrelentingly
through the lens of his beloved community, and through his concept of
nonviolence as "love in action."l 4 3 King welcomed all into the civil rights
movement so long as they trained in, and committed to, love in action.4
King wats steady in his belief that it was through engagement, not disen-
gagement, that all members of a community would come to a commit-
140. See Interview by Sarah Schulman with Mark Harrington, ACT UP Oral History Project
(March 8, 2003) at 58-59, available at
http://www.actuporalhistory.org/interviews/images/harrington.pdf:
141. Piomelli, supra note 21, at 463.
142. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM CrrY JAIL (1963), reprintedin A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 298-99 ("let me rush on to mention my other disappoint-
ment. I have been so greatly disappointed with the white church and its leadership... . I felt that the
white ministers, priests and rabbis of the South would be some of our strongest allies. Instead, some
have been outright opponents, refusing to understand the freedom movement and misrepresenting its
leaders .... )
143. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., An Experiment in Love, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE,
supra note 101, at 16-20 ("Agape is not a weak, passive love. It is love in action. Agape is love
seeking to preserve and create community. It is insistence on community even when one seeks to
break it.").
144. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Nonviolence: The Only Road to Freedom, reprinted in A A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 54-61.
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ment of equality. 145 Nothing about the approach was easy, nor was the
change swift. But, change did come. 14 6
A final concern with the approach presented in this Article may be
that it defies a fundamental and necessary condition of social change-
that there is an identifiable group that has a grievance against another. 147
Social movement theorists have posited that there is no movement until a
group constructs an identity for itself that is in opposition to another. 148
That boundary drawing serves important functions of legitimating the
group and spurring collective action.149 The drawing of the boundary
between "us" and "them" provides the glue that allows "us" to be effec-
tive collective actors. Without that glue, social movement work does not
even begin.
In fact, the approach in this Article presumes that some sort of
group boundary drawing does happen and has some practical utility. A
cause lawyer and cause client must first self-identify as such, and in the
process discern as a starting matter who else has the same problem that
needs solving. There must be some initial conversations and organizing
work that happens in order to build a group that has sufficient energy,
resources, and skills to proceed with social change work. The group
needs to be sufficiently cohesive so that its members' efforts can be co-
ordinated and so that the group can assess how effective those efforts
have been. Relational loyalty between cause lawyer and cause client still
requires all of the above to occur; however, it encourages formation to
happen in harmony with a set of expectations about how the group is
situated more broadly within a web of relationships, and that advocacy
efforts will be imbued with curiosity and compassion. Thus, whatever
useful notions of "us" and "them" are needed at the beginning of organ-
izing do not become so rigid and hardened to preclude expanding bound-
aries.
145. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SHOWDOWN FOR NONVIOLENCE (1968), reprinted in A A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 64-72; MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE ETHICAL
DEMANDS FOR INTEGRATION (1963), reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 117-
25.
146. 1 do not mean my brief description of Dr. King's work to suggest that the civil rights
movement was something other than a complicated and nuanced sociological, psychological, and
political drama. My point is not to capture a complete picture of the civil rights movement, but to be
clear about how straightforward were Dr. King's first principles, and to suggest that his first princi-
ples mattered to outcomes.
147. See Melucci, supra note 13, at 48 (a collective "makes the basic assumption that its dis-
tinction from other actors is constantly acknowledged by them, even in the extreme form of denial);
see also Jennifer Fredette, Social Movements and the State's Construction of Identity: The Case of
Muslims in France, 54 STUD. LAW, POL. & SOC'Y 45, 54 (2011) (arguing that there is no real Mus-
lim social movement in France because Muslims currently have no "collective identity," but, instead,
"there is great variation and even spirited disagreement" about identity, kinds of grievances, and
goals of activism).
148. See Melucci, supra note 13, at 48.
149. Id. at 48-49.
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CONCLUSION
Fundamentally, cause lawyers engage in their work to make social
change. Scholars of cause lawyering have generated a robust and rich
literature considering important issues such as what kinds of advocacy
work best to generate social change and what features are critical to an
engaged and mutual relationship between cause lawyer and cause client.
But the literature has neglected a key aspect of that relationship-
whether the particular kind of loyalty that exists between cause lawyer
and cause client hinders or helps in achieving social change.
This Article has taken up that inquiry. It has demonstrated that
cause lawyers and cause clients expect each other to show a heightened
level of fidelity to each other, what I have labeled hyper-loyalty. A criti-
cal feature of hyper-loyalty is that cause lawyers and cause clients view
the advocacy landscape as consisting only of friends and enemies. Fur-
ther, because of several dynamics, including the force of cognitive heu-
ristics and biases, and the force of intentional relationship choices, cause
lawyers and cause clients maintain strict and rigid classifications be-
tween friends and enemies. Thus, cause lawyers and cause clients view
any overtures to enemies as exceedingly disloyal behavior. The force and
rigidity of hyper-loyalty diminishes the possibilities that cause lawyers
and cause clients can create actual social change.
However, this Article provides a way forward by suggesting that
hyper-loyalty be replaced by relational loyalty. The Article defines rela-
tional loyalty as having three critical features. First, that cause lawyers
and cause clients understand the architecture in which they are situated to
be a connected web of relationships instead of a dyadic and oppositional
structure. Second, that cause lawyers and cause clients approach the web
of relationships with curiosity instead of advocacy. Finally, that cause
lawyers and cause clients respond with compassion to all contained in
the web of relationships. This Article argues that relational loyalty incul-
cates a helpful dynamism in relationships, which in turn creates unex-
pected opportunities to craft innovative strategies or pathways to social
change.
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